Integral Launch and Reentry Vehicle: Triamese (1968-1969)

Triamese target: a large Earth-orbital "Space Base" assembled from modules launched atop two-stage Saturn V rockets. The Space Base, expected to be operational by about 1980, would be staffed by up to 100 people. Image credit: NASA.
The Triamese concept originated in 1967 in a reusable launch and reentry vehicle study General Dynamics Convair (GDC) performed on contract to the U.S. Air Force (USAF). Triamese owed its peculiar name to its peculiar launch configuration. At liftoff it would comprise one orbiter element and two booster elements. The boosters would together serve as the first stage; they would also provide propellants to the orbiter's engines during first-stage boost. One booster would attach to the orbiter's flat belly and the other to its rounded back. 

Space launch vehicle concepts with separate reusable booster and orbiter elements were not exactly new in 1967. What was different about Triamese was its strict reliance on a common booster and orbiter design. The Triamese orbiter and booster elements were intended to be virtually identical. GDC explained that

[i]n order to achieve the economy predicted for the Triamese system, the orbital and boost elements must have a high degree of commonality and must represent essentially a single development program. . .This commonality has been obtained by "overdesigning" the boost elements. . .[which] creates performance penalties that are accepted.

GDC called Triamese "a new mixture of aircraft, spacecraft, and launch vehicle." The Initial Point Design (IPD) Triamese launch stack (A, above) would have comprised two booster elements and one orbiter element, all virtually identical. It would have measured 149.5 feet (45.6 meters) tall from the trailing tips of its six rudder fins (two per element) to its three noses. B, a tail-on view of one element, shows the V-shaped, 46.1-foot (14-meter) spread of the rudder fins, 21-foot-wide (6.4-meter-wide) flat belly, and twin XLR-129 rocket engines arranged one above the other. Turning view B 45° horizontally yields view C. The IPD Triamese element would measure 31.4 feet (9.6 meters) from its belly to the tops of its rudder fins. View D displays "switchblade" wings deployed for stable subsonic flight. Wingspan is 107.5 feet (32.8 meters). Image credit: General Dynamics Convair/DSFPortree
The Triamese concept helped to shape NASA's May 1968 Integral Launch and Reentry Vehicle (ILRV) study Statement of Work and the ILRV Request for Proposal the space agency released to U.S. industry in October 1968. When time came for NASA to select four industry proposals for ILRV study contracts in January 1969, it was a foregone conclusion that Triamese would be counted among them.

NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) in Huntsville, Alabama, was tasked with managing the GDC ILRV study contract. NASA MSFC was home of the three-stage Apollo Saturn V rocket. At the time of the ILRV study, Apollo Saturn V development, manufacture, and testing were drawing to a close. Managers at the Huntsville center hoped, however, that a two-stage Saturn V variant designated INT-21 might launch a series of increasingly complex space stations in the 1970s.

INT-21 consisted of the first two stages of the Saturn V — the S-IC first stage and S-II second stage — both of which measured 33 feet (10 meters) in diameter. An Earth-orbital payload measuring up to that diameter — for example, a large space station module — would replace the 21.7-foot-diameter (6.6-meter-diameter) S-IVB third stage of the Apollo Saturn V. 

One station program scenario, favored by NASA Administrator Thomas Paine, would see INT-21-launched Apollo Applications Program (AAP) Orbital Workshops — converted S-IVB stages — lead in 1975 to a large drum-shaped station with up to 12 crewmembers. Multiple INT-21-launched large station modules might then be joined together in orbit as early as 1980 to form a "Space Base" with up to 100 staff.

In that scenario, the ILRV shuttle would serve as a Saturn V supplement. The big rocket would do the heavy lifting all through the 1970s, leaving to the smaller reusable shuttle the specialized task of affordably launching astronauts, supplies, replacement parts, and scientific experiment apparatus to the space station and returning astronauts, experiment results, and data products to Earth. 

GDC began its ILRV Triamese study with an Initial Point Design (IPD) based on its USAF study results and inputs from NASA engineers. The IPD Triamese was designed to deliver up to 25,000 pounds (11,340 kilograms) of supplies and equipment to the space station and return up to 2500 pounds (1130 kilograms) to Earth during a single flight. The two boosters and the orbiter would each carry a flight crew of two astronauts, for a total of six. In addition, the orbiter would include a passenger compartment for transporting 10 astronauts to and from the space station. 

Orbiter and booster commonality was not the only cost-saving principle underpinning the IPD Triamese system. Another was use of off-the-shelf technology. GDC proposed, for example, that the design of the Triamese "switchblade" wings, which would enable stable flight at subsonic speeds, should be based on the variable-geometry wing system of the F-111 "Aardvark" aircraft the company manufactured for the USAF. 

The variable-geometry wings of the supersonic F-111 in action. In 1967, the F-111 became the first variable-geometry aircraft to enter active service. Image credit: U.S. Air Force.
GDC envisioned that the IPD Triamese elements would, like operational airplanes, fly repeatedly with minimal refurbishment between flights. The company acknowledged, however, that the elements would be subjected to greater stress during flight than would most aircraft, leading to greater potential for component failure.

GDC proposed to solve this problem by equipping IPD Triamese subsystems with sensors linked to on-board magnetic-tape flight recorders. After landing, data on subsystem performance would be carefully analyzed. Hardware that showed signs of actual or impending trouble would be subjected to detailed inspection and possible repair or replacement. 

The sensors would also enable a detailed on-board checkout capability that would slash costs by allowing NASA to get by with only a simple launch control center. KSC's Apollo Saturn launch control center was expansive and expensive, with many control consoles and an army of highly trained personnel; IPD Triamese launch control might more closely resemble an airport control tower. 

GDC expected that the IPD Triamese design, development, and test program would begin on 1 November 1971 and last until the first operational IPD Triamese flight on 1 January 1977, a period of 62 months. Engineering design would occur between 1 November 1971 and 1 July 1974. Development of the Pratt & Whitney XLR-129 rocket engine, which GDC called a "pacing item," would last from 1 November 1971 to 1 August 1974. Rocket engine tests using IPD Triamese vehicles that were captive  — that is, bolted down so that they could not take off — would take place between 1 March 1975 and 1 March 1976.

GDC proposed a "fatigue test vehicle" to help to ensure that the IPD Triamese elements would be as reusable as expected. This would take the form of a skeletal IPD Triamese element with all systems installed except for the metal plates and insulation blankets of its heat shield. 

Beginning on 1 November 1974, the fatigue test vehicle would undergo repeated propellant tank and cabin pressurizations, switchblade wing, turbofan jet engine, and landing gear deployments, computer starts, and other subsystem activations so that engineers could gain insight into malfunction characteristics and operational lifetimes. The tests would continue into the period of operational IPD Triamese flights.

The Initial Point Design (IPD) Triamese orbiter element differed from the booster element only in detail. Unless otherwise noted, all features called out in the side view drawing above are features of both the orbiter and the booster. A: cockpit for two astronauts seated side by side; B: passenger compartment for 10 Space Station crewmembers with seating arranged in three rows (orbiter only); C: forward landing gear (stowed). D: forward landing gear (down and locked); E: short liquid oxygen tank (orbiter); F: leeward forward pin connection (orbiter only); G: windward forward pin connection; H: cargo bay hatch (orbiter only); I: cargo bay (orbiter only); J: main landing gear (stowed); K: main landing gear (down and locked); L: short liquid hydrogen tank (orbiter only); M: switchblade wing compartment; N: leeward propellant feeds; O: windward propellant feeds; P: XLR-129 rocket engine (one of a pair); Q: body flap with elevons; R: rudder fin (one of a pair); S: rudder flap (one of a pair); T: extendible engine skirt (orbiter only — retracted); U: extendible engine skirt (orbiter only — extended). Image credit: General Dynamics Convair/DSFPortree.

Top view of IPD Triamese element. Unless otherwise noted, all features called out in the top view drawing above are features of both the orbiter and the booster. 1: cockpit windows; 2: cockpit crew hatch; 3: passenger compartment crew hatch/docking unit (orbiter only); 4: turbofan jet engine (stowed); 5: turbofan jet engine (deployed and locked); 6: long liquid oxygen tank (booster only); 7: reinforcing ring for attachment of forward pin connection (booster only) or connections (orbiter only), landing gear, and switchblade wing pivot; 8: switchblade wing pivot (one of a pair); 9: switchblade wing (deployed — one of a pair); 10: switchblade wing flap (one of a pair); 11: switchblade wing (stowed — one of a pair); 12: main landing gear (stowed); 13: cargo bay hatch/docking unit (orbiter only); 14: long liquid hydrogen tank (booster only); 15: aft attachment pin actuator (booster only); 16: leeward propellant feeds (one of a pair); 17: rudder fin (one of a pair); 18: rudder flap (one of a pair); 19: non-extendible XLR-129 rocket engine skirt (booster only); 20: body flap with elevons. Image credit: General Dynamics Convair/DSFPortree.

IPD Triamese flight testing would use "an aircraft approach." All flights would carry two test pilots per element — there would be no unpiloted IPD Triamese test flights. GDC allotted three booster elements and three orbiter elements for the IPD Triamese test program. Of these, two boosters and one orbiter would be carried over to operational flights. 

GDC scheduled 50 horizontal test flights at Edwards Air Force Base, California, between 1 October 1974 and 1 March 1976. During these tests, individual IPD Triamese elements would use their twin TF-34 turbofan jet engines to take off from a runway with their switchblade wings extended to verify subsonic flight and landing characteristics. 

The General Electric-built TF-34 engine generated 12,600 pounds (5715 kilograms) of thrust. GDC was familiar with the engine because it used it in its proposal for the U.S. Navy's S-3 Viking aircraft. The engine produced a characteristic low rumble, a sound that would no doubt have become associated with piloted spaceflight had NASA given GDC the nod to build the IPD Triamese.

A U.S. Navy S-3 Viking aircraft descends to a carrier landing. Visible is one of its two General Electric-built TF-34 jet engines. The IPD Triamese shuttle orbiter and booster elements would each have included two such engines. In the unlikely event that a returning IPD Triamese element missed its first attempt at a landing on the runway at NASA Kennedy Space Center, the jet engines would have permitted a second try. Image credit: U.S. Navy.
The company scheduled 15 single-element rocket-propelled vertical flights at NASA Kennedy Space Center (KSC) on Florida's east coast between 1 September 1975 and 1 November 1976. The tests would, among other things, enable verification of IPD Triamese flight characteristics at transonic and supersonic speeds. 

The IPD Triamese element under test would lift off from one of two launch pads built at KSC specifically for IPD Triamese launches, climb to a specified altitude, and shut down its twin rocket engines. It would then pitch over to horizontal attitude, deploy its wings and jet engines, and fly to a runway at KSC built specifically for IPD Triamese landings. 

In December 1975, the flight test program would shift into high gear as preparations began for suborbital two-element test flights, the first IPD Triamese flights to launch astronauts into space. A pair of joined booster elements would lift off vertically from a KSC IPD Triamese pad on 15 February 1976, separate, and undergo a reentry virtually identical to that they would experience during operational Triamese flights. They would then land on the KSC IPD Triamese runway. NASA would repeat this test on 1 April 1976. 

About two weeks later, on 15 April 1976, the first booster-orbiter suborbital flight test would take place. It would closely resemble the booster-booster tests. The second booster-orbiter test would occur on 1 June 1976. 

The IPD Triamese flight test series would end with a pair of three-element orbital flight tests on 1 August and 1 November 1976. The missions would see the first IPD Triamese dockings with an Earth-orbiting space station. 

The boosters and orbiter flown during the second orbital test flight would be used for "refurbishment verification" — a rehearsal of the normal IPD Triamese post-flight checkout and maintenance "turnaround" process — then the orbiter and one booster would be held in reserve as "standby elements" for the first operational flight of the IPD Triamese program on 1 January 1977.

Availability of standby elements — a backup orbiter and a backup booster — would be a standard part of preparation for every operational IPD Triamese mission. If an active orbiter or active booster suffered damage or malfunctioned and required time-consuming repairs, a standby element would fill in for it so that launch could go ahead as scheduled. This approach recognized the critical role reliable space transportation would play in NASA's space station program. 

GDC proposed that, in addition to the two standby elements, NASA's IPD Triamese fleet should include four active orbiters and six active boosters. The orbiters would each fly once per month, for a total of 48 orbiter flights per year. The boosters would each fly 16 times per year, for a total of 96 booster flights. 

Diagram of IPD Triamese orbiter and booster turnaround flow. In one month, four active orbiters would lift off from Kennedy Space Center, Florida. In the same period, four active boosters would fly once and two would fly twice. A fifth orbiter and a seventh booster would serve as "standby elements" ready to enter the turnaround flow if an active orbiter or booster should be grounded for repairs. Image credit: General Dynamics Convair/DSFPortree.

At the start of every operational IPD Triamese mission, turnaround technicians would load the 17.5-foot-diameter (5.3-meter-diameter), 12.4-foot-long (3.8-meter-long) payload bay located between the orbiter's liquid oxygen tank and its liquid hydrogen tank with 25,000 pounds (11,340 kilograms) of supplies and equipment bound for the Space Station. The orbiter propellant tanks would be made shorter than the booster tanks to make room for the 3000-cubic-foot (85-cubic-meter) bay.

Turnaround technicians would next pump consumables into the IPD Triamese elements. These would include 4660 pounds (2110 kilograms) of jet fuel for each booster and 1610 pounds (730 kilograms) for the orbiter, along with 3820 pounds (1730 kilograms) of attitude control propellants for the orbiter and 1420 pounds (645 kilograms) for each booster. 

The three elements would then be towed to the launch pad on their extended tricycle landing gear, hoisted vertical, and, after their landing gear was retracted, mounted on the pad on three support struts each. After the vehicles were joined to each other by three "pin connections," one forward and two aft, five support struts (the three supporting the orbiter and one each supporting the boosters) would be removed, leaving in place two per booster. 

Launch pad technicians would connect propellant feed lines linking the orbiter and the booster propulsion systems and attach umbilical hoses for propellant tank loading. After a leak check using on-board checkout equipment, they would fill the orbiter's tanks with 362,800 pounds (164,560 kilograms) of liquid oxygen and 51,830 pounds (23,510 kilograms) of liquid hydrogen. Each booster would be loaded with 424,500 pounds (192,550 kilograms) of liquid oxygen and 62,890 pounds (28,525 kilograms) of liquid hydrogen. Before vacating the vehicles, the pad technicians would conduct a final check of the propulsion system using on-board checkout equipment. 

The three flight crews and passengers would board, then the flight crews would perform a final check of all on-board systems save propulsion. Finally, at a time selected to enable a quick rendezvous with the Space Station, the six XLR-129 engines would ignite and power up to 20% of maximum sea-level thrust. There they would briefly hold to allow the flight crews to check engine performance. If all six engines were found to be operating normally, they would power up to 100%, hold-down attachments on the four support struts would disconnect, and the IPD Triamese stack would lift off.

IPD Triamese launch and ascent: the IPD Triamese launch stack (A) would stage at an altitude of 160,000 feet (48,770 meters) (B). The twin boosters would undergo a low-stress suborbital reentry (C), then would level off at 15,000 feet (4570 meters). Their flight crews would extend their jet engines and wings, then fly back in tandem to their NASA KSC base (D), a distance of 185 nautical miles (340 kilometers). The orbiter, meanwhile, would continue its journey (E) to the Space Station in 270 nautical-mile (500-kilometer) low-Earth orbit. Image credit: General Dynamics Convair/DSFPortree.

At liftoff, the four booster engines would each generate 394,500 pounds (178,715 kilograms) of thrust; the two orbiter engines, 380,000 pounds (172,365 kilograms) each. GDC calculated that the IPD Triamese stack would weigh 1,751,000 pounds (794,240 kilograms) at liftoff. Of this, the boosters would each account for 596,450 pounds (270,545 kilograms) and the orbiter, 558,100 pounds (253,150 kilograms).

During the first stage of ascent, the twin booster elements would supply all propellants to their own engines and the two orbiter engines. GDC did not specify how long first-stage flight would last. The company calculated, however, that the entire journey from launch pad to orbit would last only 6.2 minutes. Acceleration during ascent would top out at four times the pull of Earth's gravity.

GDC assumed that NASA's space station destination would circle the Earth in an orbit inclined 55° relative to Earth's equator. IPD Triamese launch azimuth would, however, be set at 35° to avoid overflight of the U.S. east coast early in the ascent phase. This meant that the orbiter would have to perform a westward yaw ("dogleg") maneuver to reach 55° orbit.

GDC estimated that flight conditions during ascent were 500 times more likely to cause a system failure than were conditions in space. As might be expected, engines, propellant feeds, and avionics were the systems most likely to malfunction. The company cited possible failure modes virtually certain to lead to structural failure and loss of life in as little as one second — for example, a hydraulic system failure that would cause the engines of one of the three elements to gimbal (pivot) and lock suddenly. 

To avoid such catastrophic failures, GDC proposed automatic malfunction detection and switchover to backup systems. This approach would, the company estimated, reduce the IPD Triamese catastrophic failure rate to one in 2000 flights.

Switching to backups might allow an IPD Triamese mission to proceed as normal. Even if an abort were necessary, under most circumstances the boosters would return to the KSC runway as normal. The orbiter, on the other hand, might seek to return directly to KSC, reach a low orbit and return to KSC after circling the Earth once (the generally preferred option), bank eastward and land downrange on the North Atlantic island of Bermuda, or, in the worst-case scenario, ditch at sea or crash-land on the Arctic ice cap. 

Booster thrust per engine would increase to 433,300 pounds (196,540 kilograms) just before burnout. The orbiter engines, meanwhile, would each extend an expendable skirt just before staging, allowing an increase in thrust per engine to 460,500 pounds (208,880 kilograms). 

The boosters would expend their propellants as the IPD Triamese stack reached a speed of 6800 feet per second (2070 meters per second). After booster separation, thrust per orbiter engine would steadily decrease until it reached 310,000 pounds (140,620 kilograms) just before shutdown. 

After they separated from the orbiter, the boosters would perform a suborbital reentry and turn toward KSC. They would deploy their switchblade wings and jet engines and fly back to base at a speed of 225 miles (365 kilometers) per hour. 

Staging during ascent to orbit: the operations illustrated above would last no longer than nine seconds. The orbiter (A) is shown with twin XLR-129 engines firing and engine skirts extended. Pyrotechnic bolts would fire in the booster (B) forward pin connections, allowing aerodynamic drag and inertia to cause the boosters to tip away from the orbiter. C: aft pin connection actuators on the boosters would simultaneously extend to ensure adequate clearance between the booster body flaps and the orbiter engine bells. D: after the boosters tipped back to an angle of 20° relative to the orbiter center line, pyrotechnic bolts would fire to sever the two aft pin connections. E: the aft pin connection actuators on the boosters would retract. The boosters would then roll to turn their windward sides toward their direction of flight and begin return to NASA Kennedy Space Center. Image credit: General Dynamics Convair/DSFPortree.

GDC proposed an IPD Triamese Reaction Control System (RCS) with 24 nitrogen tetroxide/hydrazine thrusters, most of which would cluster near the nose and tail. Of the 24, half would generate 1420 pounds (644 kilograms) of thrust and half 1160 pounds. 

Eight of the former would serve as orbital maneuvering thrusters, with four facing forward and four aft. These would permit the orbiter flight crew to circularize their orbit at space station altitude and perform rendezvous and station-keeping with the station. The company noted that the eight orbital maneuvering thrusters could be omitted from the boosters if doing so would save money.

The IPD Triamese orbiter mission would last 25 hours. Of this, the orbiter would spend 17.3 hours attached to the space station, during which time it would rely on station electricity, attitude control, life support, and communications. 

Precisely how the orbiter would link up with the space station was not explained. The liquid oxygen tank would be located between the cargo bay and the passenger compartment, preventing movement between them; for this reason, each would require an exterior hatch. This implies the existence of two docking units, one for each hatch, or a station hangar surrounding both hatches that could be pressurized. Though drawings show the cargo bay hatch as round, GDC described it as square and five feet (1.7 meters) wide. 

The company also did not describe the method of cargo transfer. No doubt the transfer of 25,000 pounds (11,340 kilograms) of supplies and equipment to the space station would need to be carefully orchestrated if it was to be completed in 17.3 hours. In addition, 2500 pounds (1130 kilograms) of cargo would be loaded into the cargo bay and 10 passengers at the end of their space station tour-of-duty would board the orbiter for return to Earth.

Shortly after departing the space station, the flight crew would use the orbital maneuvering thrusters to perform a deorbit burn, then carefully orient the orbiter for reentry. It would enter the atmosphere moving at 25,912 feet (7900 meters) per second at an altitude of 400,000 feet (122,000 meters) and would slow to 20,000 feet (6100 meters) per second at an altitude of 200,000 feet (61,000 meters). At these speeds, the orbiter would compress the thin air in its path, causing severe aerodynamic heating.

GDC described the IPD Triamese Thermal Protection System (TPS) heat shield in greater detail than any other system. Mostly it would comprise overlapping metal "cover panels" backed by thermal insulation blankets. The company divided the TPS into windward (nose, belly, and leading edge) and leeward (everywhere else) sections.

The composition of the TPS cover panels and the composition and thickness of the insulation behind them would depend on many factors. These would include orbiter reentry angle, banking angle, potential for air cooling, location on the orbiter, and the existence of new development programs aimed at perfecting existing TPS materials or producing new ones. 

The majority of the panels would be mounted on posts attached to the propellant tanks, which were meant to serve as "primary structure." GDC modeled its tank design on that of the Saturn V S-II second stage, which it said was made up of "cylindrical integrated pressure tanks." These could carry structural loads while unpressurized except during launch and ascent. In areas where no propellant tanks were available — mainly over the cockpit and passenger compartment, the cargo bay, and the engine compartment — the panels would be mounted on posts attached to a "trapezoidal framework." 

For its IPD Triamese TPS calculations, the company assumed an entry angle no greater than 1°. This would yield skin temperatures ranging from 3950° Fahrenheit (F) (2180° Celsius — C) on the windward side of the orbiter nose to 700° F (370° C) on the leeward side of the fuselage 90 feet (27 meters) aft of the nose. 

Most of the IPD Triamese would be covered by TD Nickel-Chromium (TD Ni-Cr) panels capable of withstanding a reentry temperature of up to 2400° F (1315° C). TD Ni-Cr is a thorium oxide-coated alloy. The panels would measure just 0.01 inches (0.254 millimeters) thick. At that thickness, they would weigh 1.75 pounds (0.8 kilograms) per square foot (0.09 square meters). GDC estimated that the typical TD Ni-Cr panel could withstand 50 reentries before it would need to be replaced. 

The nose and rudder fin leading edges would create special TPS problems. GDC called a thorium oxide-coated tungsten nose cap a "representative" state-of-the-art system. This would, however, need to be replaced after every third flight, so the company called for accelerated development of new TPS materials. The rudder fin leading edges, which would be made of costly coated tantalum, would need to be replaced after every 10th flight. 

The insulation blankets behind the panels would comprise layers of Microquartz and Dynaflex, products of the Johns Manville Corporation. Microquartz, which would make up one-third of the thickness of the blanket when used with Dynaflex, would be made of silica microfibers. It could withstand temperatures up to 1600° F (870° C). Dynaflex, an aluminum oxide, silica, and chromium oxide microfiber material that could withstand temperatures up to 2800° F (1540° C), would make up the remaining two-thirds of the blanket thickness.

Insulation blanket thickness and composition would depend on location on the vehicle. It would, for example, consist of Microquartz and Dynaflex and measure 3.7 inches (9.4 centimeters) thick on the windward side of the cockpit/passenger compartment area. A layer of Microquartz alone just 0.8 inches (2 centimeters) thick would suffice on the leeward side beginning about 60 feet (18.3 meters) aft of the nose.

The orbiter would maneuver during hypersonic reentry using its rudder fin-mounted flaps and body flap-mounted elevons. Initial calculations showed that a 20° bank initiated at 400,000 feet (122,000 meters) would permit a landing up to 450 nautical miles (830 kilometers) off the orbital track while causing an average increase in surface temperature of only 40° F (23° C). More detailed calculations suggested a different approach: a 45° bank gradually reduced to 10° at 200,000 feet (61,000 meters), then gradually increased again to 45°.

GDC proposed that vehicle primary structure temperature be controlled through "detailed air injection" during flight. Vents in the fuselage would be opened during descent to admit air, then ducts would channel it to hot areas to keep the temperature below 200° F (93° C). The company calculated that failure to air-cool the IPD Triamese orbiter would allow heat to "soak" into the vehicle, driving primary structure temperature to a punishing 330° F (166° C) 50 minutes after landing.

Like the boosters during their return to KSC, the orbiter would slow to subsonic speed at an altitude of 15,000 feet (4570 meters). It would, however, reach that altitude nearer the KSC landing strip than would the boosters. The orbiter would then deploy its TF-34 jet engines and switchblade wings. Subsonic flight under jet power would last no more than 10 minutes. 

About 400 feet (120 meters) above the ground, the flight crew would lower the landing gear and perform a flare maneuver, raising the orbiter's nose so that its main landing gear would touch the runway first. The flight crew and passengers would feel a deceleration equal to two times Earth's gravity at touchdown. Landing would occur at a speed of 180 miles (290 kilometers) per hour; rollout would measure less than 10,000 feet (3050 meters) with switchblade wing flaps down and less than 13,000 feet (3960 meters) with flaps up.  Maximum landing weight was 135,300 pounds (61,370 kilograms).

Desk model of Triamese launch (left) and landing flare configurations. The landing flare configuration model displays switchblade wings (colored orange), one of two deployed TF-34 jet engines (colored silver), and tricycle landing gear. Image credit: National Air and Space Museum.

Immediately after landing, the orbiter would again enter the turnaround flow, joining the boosters with which it had launched a little more than a day before. GDC determined that, under normal circumstances, an IPD Triamese orbiter would require 810 person-hours of turnaround servicing, while a booster would need 490 person-hours. A normal orbiter turnaround could be completed in a week by two teams of 23 technicians working two eight-hour shifts. Flight data recorder analysis, mission planning, and payload preparation would need additional time. 

Occasional additional tasks would add to turnaround time. GDC envisioned a special engine inspection every six months and an annual three-day "calendar inspection," which would see technicians visually inspect the interior of the liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen tanks along with all wiring and plumbing. Every two years, technicians would spend three weeks performing "progressive rework" maintenance, during which they would remove the entire TPS to allow a detailed inspection of all vehicle systems and system replacement and updating as necessary.

As the ILRV study continued into the Spring of 1969, NASA, often acting at the request of the USAF, imposed new requirements on its contractors. Most new requirements reflected an ongoing shift in reusable vehicle purpose away from low-cost space station resupply and crew rotation and toward general spaceflight cost savings. 

In April 1969, NASA asked the ILRV contractors to add a 15-foot-wide-by-60-foot-long (4.6-meter-wide-by-18.4-meter-long) payload bay to the orbiter component of their designs. The contractors were also directed to study designs that could place 50,000 pounds (22,680 kilograms) or 100,000 pounds (45,360 kilograms) of payload into low-Earth orbit. 

At about the same time, the space agency requested that they study orbiter missions independent of a station lasting up to 30 days. Such missions would, in effect, see the orbiter function as a short-term space station. This was an ill omen for NASA's ambitious space station aspirations. 

Adding a large payload bay and long-duration missions to the IPD Triamese orbiter undermined the cost-saving principle of boost element and orbiter element commonality. GDC sought to accommodate the new requirements within its Triamese proposal; for example, the company proposed clustering more than two booster elements around an expendable second stage attached to a large payload. By October 1969, however, it was clear that the Triamese concept's days were numbered. 

On 13 January 1970, NASA Administrator Paine announced that the Saturn V assembly line would be shut down permanently. AAP would, however, continue under the new name Skylab. The Apollo 20 Moon mission would be canceled so that its Saturn V could be stripped of its S-IVB third stage and put to work launching Skylab into Earth orbit. 

That same month, the ILRV study was redesignated Space Shuttle Phase A. On 28 January 1970, GDC teamed up with North American Rockwell (NAR) to compete jointly for a Space Shuttle Phase B contract, which they subsequently won. GDC applied its ILRV study experience to the design of a reusable Booster for an NAR reusable Orbiter.


"Togetherness," M. Getler, Aerospace Technology, 17 July 1967, p. 70.

"MOL Switch Forthcoming," Aerospace Technology, 1 January 1968, p. 3.

Memorandum, Douglas Lord, Deputy Director, Advanced Manned Missions Program, NASA Headquarters, to Maxime Faget, Manned Spacecraft Center, "Manned Spacecraft Center Revised FY 1967 Advanced Study Program," 10 April 1968.

"Pace of Post-Apollo Planning Rises," W. Normyle, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 3 February 1969, pp. 16.

"NASA Aims at 100-Man Station," W. Normyle, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 24 February 1969, pp. 16-17.

"Large Station May Emerge as 'Unwritten' U.S. Goal," W. Normyle, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 10 March 1969, pp. 103, 105, 109.

Triamese Reusable Launch Vehicle/Spacecraft Status Report II, Report No. GDC-DCB69-014, General Dynamics - Convair Division, 7 May 1969.

A Shuttle Chronology 1964-1973: Abstract Concepts to Letter Contracts, Volume I: Abstract Concepts to Engineering Data; Defining the Operational Potential of the Shuttle, Management Analysis Office, Administration Directorate, NASA Johnson Space Center, December 1988, pp. I-10 - I-15, I-81 - I-83, I-85, I-87 - I-95, I-101 - I-102, II-108 - II-110, II-138 - II-140, II-156, II-158 - II-159, II-166 - II-167, II-182 - II-184.

More Information

"Without Hiatus": The Apollo Applications Program in June 1966

X-15: Lessons for Reusable Winged Spaceflight (1966)

"A True Gateway": Robert Gilruth's June 1968 Space Station Presentation

Think Big: A 1970 Flight Schedule for NASA's 1969 Integrated Program Plan

McDonnell Douglas Phase B Space Station (1970)


  1. David,

    Is the T-18 vehicle the same model, or an earlier/later one?

    Looking here, the T-18 seems to call out a (very twisting!) crew access tunnel from the side, to the forward crew spaces, and aft to the cargo volume. Perhaps something similar was envisioned, and omitted from the Initial Point Design?

  2. Rob:

    That's really nifty. The report I have just begins looking at possible next steps for Triamese. I don't see any reference to T-18 in it, but that's intriguing, since it implies at least 18 variants! This would be a later version - the IPD Triamese is what emerged from the USAF study in 1967 plus NASA inputs in early 1968, just before the start of the Integral Launch and Reentry Vehicle study. I purposely used the last study document I could find before the IPD Triamese went away so I could focus on it. It's the Triamese version best suited to being a Space Station ferry, and that's what I wanted to portray. I think the IPD Triamese would have worked as a Space Station ferry, but it couldn't stand turning into an all-purpose vehicle. Moving propellants out of the orbiter to make room for cargo meant the propellants had to move to the boosters, which made the boosters grow, which led to the loss of cost-saving commonality, which led to dropping one booster, which in turn led to a booster-orbiter configuration not all that different from two of the other ILRV study vehicles.


    1. According to Jenkins "Space Shuttle, the History of Developing the National Space Transportation System", the T-18 vehicle was the result of earlier work General Dynamics had done on the Air Force's reusable orbital vehicle study, which was also confusingly called IRLV (!). The triamese vehicle was designated as the FR4.

    2. Perhaps I'm just grouchy, but the Triamese doesn't seem like a great idea. You've got to service and maintain 3 vehicles (and 2 of them being identical MIGHT reduce that to servicing the equivalent of 2.5 vehicles instead of 3, at best), the orbiter isn't really optimized for anything other than 2 day cargo runs to the space station, I'm curious about the weight penalty incurred by the swing wing mechanism...and GDC's maintenance times are wildly optimistic (although, to be fair, that's said with the benefit of hindsight).

    3. Capt Steve:

      The Initial Point Design (IPD) Triamese is also called the C configuration in the document I used as my main source (listed at the bottom of the post). There's also a B2 design and some other designations. None is the T-18. There's no FR4 or T-18 in my source document. My goal was to get at the "final" NASA Space Station Triamese design - that's what the IPD Triamese is. The Triamese concept grew out of USAF studies - in particular a 1967 study (as I explain in my post), but also some studies of materials. I wasn't too interested in that story, except insofar as it affected the Space Station ferry Triamese. NASA started out focused on a Space Station ferry, not a general purpose reusable launcher, but shifted toward a general-purpose vehicle (that could also service a space station). Basically, it was a USAF/NASA partnership that NASA thought was mainly a NASA thing but then learned was equally a USAF thing. One can argue it was mostly a USAF thing. NASA did the study for USAF at its own expense - but intergovernmental studies don't really work like that. That is, NASA would not have been permitted to study a big reusable vehicle without that USAF blessing (it studied reusable vehicles on its own before ILRV, but they were on the small side, with throwaway boosters). Anyway, you're exactly right when you say IPD Triamese was optimised for Space Station runs - that's the point! ;-) GDC argued that it would have worked in that role, too. But when new requirements were placed on the Triamese design, it turned rapidly into a lousy orbiter combined with a lousy pair of lousy boosters. So it went away.


    4. Capt Steve:

      I forgot to mention - when Triamese was studied, no one was sure how to build an economical reusable vehicle. Triamese was as good a guess as any!


  3. Triamese main issue (basically) is "boosters can't be orbiters, and orbiters can't be boosters".
    Their flight regimes are just too different. And if the elements are tweaked then commonality is lost and the end result is something akin to the 1969-71 Phase B Shuttle designs.

    Otherwise it was a pretty smart concept !

    One can wonder if it draw inspiration from the British contemporary MUSTARD. Nobody can say for sure.

    Note that if two elements launched separately and briefly joined during ascent (a suborbital parabola) for a brief LOX transfer - the booster-vs-orbiter design issues would be less, and payload to orbit would be larger.
    (yes I'm the same guy who wrote this, if you wann know)

    One of the Triamese elements could also be mated to an expendable S-IVB and get a large payload to orbit.

    1. AL:

      I generally caution people that I'm an historian, not an engineer. Triamese is interesting, and I think it illustrates part of the shift from Shuttle as station ferry to Shuttle as everything. That is, it began with a specialized role and had to grow and change to satisfy a broader range of requirements. I suspect that, even if it had gone ahead as a Station ferry, it would have run into problems when it tried to use the Orbiter TPS unchanged as the Booster TPS. As I say, I'm not an engineer, but I suspect the weight and cost of the TPS would have been greater than estimated and that would have had knock-on effects throughout the system.

      That being said, I've always been fond of this one.


  4. Triamese concept was nice
    but it had several problems

    The variable-geometry wings were a new Technology in end of 1960s
    and USAF and NASA were not confidence in this
    in fact GDC build in same time the F-111
    It had serious issue with there variable-geometry wings,
    That GDC took the help of Grumman to fix the issue.
    in mean time USAF and NASA were in Dispute about Shuttle Wing design
    were USAF Delta wing demand won

    Another issue were the Engines for Triamese
    The Pratt & Whitney XLR-129 was favour of USAF, NASA wanted new engine.
    i don't know what exactly happen, in the end Rocketdyne SSME was used
    (with little help of German company MBB)


I like hearing from my readers. No rules except the obvious ones - please keep it civil and on topic.

Advertiser comments have led me to enable comment moderation.